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Understanding the Brothers of Italy, ft. Valerio Alfonso Bruno

Episode 66 · February 13th, 2026 · 1 hr 11 mins

About this Episode

Right-wing authoritarian and extremist movements are on the march worldwide. This podcast will host some of the globe's leading experts on the radical right to help us understand the development of these extremists. Each episode, hosts and guests bring their specialist insights to break down the critical people, places, organizations, actions, and ideas of the radical right. Produced by the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right

Transcript

Hello and welcome

to Right Rising, the official podcast

of the Far Right Analysis Network.

I'm your host, Alexander Reed-Ross,

and today on the show we have Dr. Valerio

Alfonso Bruno, whose latest book

with Mara Morini, The Rise of the Brothers

of Italy, Organization, Leadership, and

ideology is in my opinion the best book

that's been published on the subject uh yet

it's a wonderful book uh dr bruno is over

at the universita catholica in milano

and um he works at the polidemos think tank

uh so it's a wonderful to have you here um

and thank you very much for joining the

podcast thank you very much uh alexander for

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inviting me it's a pleasure to to be here

with you great um so like i said i i really

enjoyed this book um and uh in my opinion

my take on it is what we're seeing in your

work on uh the fratelli d'italia also called

the fdi or FDE, is a fascinating politics

of individuation. Maloney's leader

-driven politics avoid ambiguities, complications,

and vagueness associated with

weak parliamentary coalitions. They

give her leeway to do international politics by

personal relationships, in which she can

still maintain credible independence,

as with Ursula von der Leyen, and enable

differentiation from the broader European

radical right as represented by Matteo

Salvini in Italy. They offer an economic

conservatism distinct from technocracy and

populism, and they situate Italy as a

partner in the new, quote, geopolitical Europe

discussion emerging from the attenuated

Atlanticist position. And there are other

points that your book raises, but I wanted

to start by clarifying how your book kind

of articulates the individuation process

through which the Fratelli d'Italia

has become a kind of unique and actually

quite strong political player in a country

exhausted by fragile emergency-based

parliamentary coalitions that tend to offer

disappointing results. So here are my

questions. So the first question, when Giorgia

Maloney was elected in 2022, there was a deluge

of news reports in the United States

declaring that a fascist had won the prime

minister spot in Italy. And since then, she's

presented a more moderate administration

that she characterizes as a political

government. But your work also describes a

worrying debate about the normalization both of

fascism and of the far right. We've seen

recent scandals around the historical revision

of the anti-fascist resistance and the

fascist state for instance surrounding fascist

publishers surfacing at important book

fairs so my question is is fascism making a

comeback in italy okay thank you very much

for your for your question um i I will go

straight to the point. No, it's not making

a comeback. I know back to 2022, when

Brothers of Italy won the election,

there was a lot of worries in the media,

public opinion, not just in Italy,

but as you said, a little bit in other

contexts, including our allies, like in the

case of the U.S. So I would say no, it's not

the case, yet there are some aspects where

I would be cautious, especially if we put

what is happening in Italy and the leadership

of Meloni and her party, the role they

have in this government in a broader context.

So if we also look at what's going on in

Germany, where according to the polls, the first

party is a half-day alternative for

Deutschland, and it's a far -right, extreme right

party. And if we look at France, another

big country in Europe, also there, according

to the polls, Rassemblement National

is the first party. So, I mean, if we give a

broader view, a broader perspective, and also

if we account what's going on in the US,

yes, it is really worrying. So, I mean,

it's a problem of context. As concerned, specifically

Italy, I would say Meloni government

has provided to be very stable so far.

Probably nobody was expecting this coalition

to last that long. Probably it may last

up to five years and that would be for

a government in the Republican history of

Italy, like completely record and

unprecedented. so I would say this is already

quite an important news for Italy we

are really not used as a country to be

granted that level of political stability

which is also useful vis-a-vis let's say

just one financial markets so this could

be positive news so yes I would say

Going back to your question about the

comeback of fascism, authoritarian, democratic backsliding, for sure there are

some problems, but I would say it is more

regarding liberal democracies today. their

status it's quite weak it's a problem of of

institutions i think it's not just a

problem of of political actors of movements

of parties that are on the far right extreme

right i will say also the other the other

côté the other side of it is like we as

you know like in these democracies and our

institution we are getting you know like

uh really too much thought when we are

confronting these these movements we are

increasingly tolerating them so i think in these

in the in the next year could be really

like risky uh i guess right yeah so that's

an interesting um place to end it looking

at uh the tolerance of um far-right groups

and organizations. Your text does an

excellent job at developing a multi-level

analysis of political classifications

involving, you know, the Brothers of Italy,

which I think is also interesting to apply

in other countries, other parties. So you look

at the categorizations of fascist or post

-fascist or even a-fascist, which is

non-fascist, I guess. And so when we're

looking at the Fratelli d'Italia today, it's

very complicated because they're not

what they were in 2012, right? They

present different features in foreign

and domestic policies. So that's

another weird thing. What we're

seeing, you know, in Maloney is not

what you're seeing. and their opposition

to populist economic redistribution is also

tempered by things like taxes on bank

profits that they tried to do, which can ultimately

showcase a kind of political acumen that

we're not actually used to seeing very

often. So I think that your book really

locates the post-fascism discourse as one that

scholars really ought to take more seriously.

um so can you discuss your findings about

the post-fascist categorization as it

pertains to and the fratelli d'italia yeah sure um

i would say there is for sure like a

ideological core concerning the the the roots uh

the political card to all of brothers of

italy or fratelli d 'italia which as we know

it comes from a really specific political and

historical tradition of italy after the end

of the second world war with the msi

movimento sociale italiano and so this is for

sure like the roots are in like neo-fascism

but then with the the political history of

italy these kind of movements they they

also had to go through like decades to be

accepted to to try to go into the mainstream

of of italian politics they did you know after

refuge in 1994 when they had to i would

say really normalize and moderate to be

considered like all the other parties and i

would say fratelli italia he goes of course in

in this direction of moderation but at the

same time and this is very peculiar and i

think this is really interesting of of meloni

of ever leadership style but of the the

whole party and they are able to to have at

the same time like moderation so to be

included i mean into the italian mainstream and

the the political system of italy but i mean

also at the european union level and on the

other hand they can also keep the radical

uh part the radical sides there is like in

italy quite controversial policies that have

been you know like working like for for

instance vis-a-vis immigration policy

the model of you know bringing you know some

migrants to to albania this has been looked

at by european union institution with the

curiosity with interest or like next month

in in march in italy there will be a referendum

on the separation of the careers of

the judge that uh the real problem is here

is like really a clash between politics i mean

right-wing politics and on the other hand

the judiciary so was going to have the

upper hand there is a the premierato or uh

temptation to try to to to give more power

to the prime minister of italy and less power

to the parliament so i would say there are

some radical policies but on the other hand

this party brothers of italy is really

an example of on the other end of good and

successful moderation of inclusion and i've

also after the book i'm also working on

a very interesting aspects like from a

symbolic point of view when this when this party

has been undergoing under inclusion under

moderation is try to reactivating like a

reaction or something reactive to to the

moderation to the inclusion how also with like

going back to these symbols like for instance

the the the flame there was a big debate

in italy in the last years what to do with

the flame it's as everybody knows it's like

Like the flame is like really neo-fascist

symbol. And it's always there in the logo of

Fratelli d'Italia and Brothers of Italy.

So, I mean, now it's really integrated in the

system at the domestic level, at the European

Union level. So why don't dismiss this

flame from the logo? Exactly because they

want to show like this is a form of continuity

of identity. And I would say also like

reinforcement of their, you know, like political

identity, like, okay, now we are

integrated, we moderated, we are really included

in the system, but still the flame has

to be there. no matter like even if politicians

from brothers of italy or like journalists

or like senators like liliana segre

they accuse this symbol to be controversial

the the flame is still not there and they will

still there so it's like compensating

on one hand for the moderation to be included

in a broader system to be mainstream but

the other hand you're going to compensate

also So I would say symbolic politics here

is playing a big role. So again, and on this, I guess

a lot has to do with the skills of

Giorgia Meloni. Her leadership has really

been doing an amazing job here. She's able

to keep like moderation and institutionalization

on one hand. On the other hand,

we're keeping, you know, like her identity,

the identity of the party, the roots

of the party is still very strong with,

you know, you can really identify with

a peculiar ideology. Some would say, you

know, fascist, some would say post-fascist,

some would say fully fledged fascist.

yeah it's like also a matter of a big debate

here of opinions but still she's able

to keep you know these two sides in in one

big you know game so on this end she's

proved to be very very skilled yeah i would

say so she keeps some of the fascism but uh

grows out a moderate sort of um uh party

from the core and is still not necessarily

able to abandon the core uh in the same way

perhaps as Gianfranco Feeney was able to

do uh I find it kind of interesting just

the history there um because you talk about

Fuji in 1994 1995 the the uh disillusion of the

mse and the foundation of the alianza

nazionale um because um the the figure like

most responsible i guess for that

transformation from the neo -fascist party into a sort

of national conservative party right

gianfranco finney had been uh the youth leader

um of the youth front i think it was uh

uh of the msc in the 1970s yeah and he

famously clashed with the more violent sort of

ultra right faction during that period um

led by uh pino rauti right uh and became

kind of the leader of uh the moderates and the

more kind of business sort of professional

uh uh outlook more as you write, more

sort of liberal, pro -Europeanist faction of

the MSC and creates the Alianza Nazionale, which Maloney joined. But then because Feeney joined with

Berlusconi, right, in, I think, 2010, um the ultimately

meloni and some of the other more radical

uh you people who had been radical youth in

the mse like ignacio lorusa loruso um

ended up creating the fratelli d'italia so

the fratelli d'italia is like supposed to

have originated from more radical elements

that resisted being subsumed by Berlusconi's

radical right. But a history of

this is really developed in the book.

You talk about it a little bit, David

Broder's book. I think it's

Grandchildren of Mussolini or something like

that. And I think that's a good book.

but but what you you do is sort of um i think

uh a big development from that which

is a more kind of analytical uh work

rather than a sort of historical

narrative um uh so the the fratelli d'italia

though even though it was radical it

sort of branded itself as centrodestra

right away, like the center right. So this

has sort of always been kind of a

contradiction of theirs. And it's always

kind of put them in a different bucket

than the Lega, right? Which is

Matteo Salvini, pretty classic populist radical

right party. So can you talk about how

the the brothers of italy have sort of

distinguished themselves from the populist

radical right yeah i think you you made

a very good point uh tracing the the history

of this party in uh what happened when

uh alianza nazionale led by finney was

joining pdr led by uh the time was led by Silvio

Berlusconi, I think many, including

Giorgia Meloni herself, they were looking

at this project of Gianfranco

Fini as a betrayal of the origins

of the party. I mean, this kind of

dynamics, they can be common if you look

through the story, as you were mentioning,

you know, with the Fugis, Volta di

Fugio, Fugio Tern, for sure, some radical

elements were no more there in Allianza

Nazionale, but they made a comeback with Fratelli

d'Italia, with this leadership. It also

depends on the context. The context today is

different. But I mean, if we compare, for

instance, with France, with the Rassemblement

Nazionale, What it went through

with Marie Le Pen, the normalization

of the party, with the expulsion of

Jean-Marie Le Pen, with the rebranding of

the party from Front National to l'Assemblément

National, with this new leadership also

with Bardella. I mean, parties, they have

this, you know, like internal dynamics, they

have to go through on one hand with the

context, with the country, the international

context as well, but also internal dynamics

in order to find the identity. There is also

always this interplay between the present, the

past, and the future. But for some instance,

you know, like this rebranding that has

been done in the Rassemblement National

under Marie Le Pen, it's very different

to what Giorgia Meloni has been doing with

Fratelli d'Italia. Fratelli d'Italia,

and I go back to your question, What it is

different from other populist radical

parties is that it keeps its ideological

core very, very different from, for instance,

the Salvinist League, which is much

more pragmatic and adapting to the context.

I'm not saying that Fratelli Italia didn't

do some pragmatic, didn't take some

pragmatic dynamics. He did very well, let's

say, at the international level, its behaviour,

but still what makes it different

from Salvini and its party, the league, it's

like there is a real tradition there is a

strong political identity and georgia meloni has

zero willingness to betray this this

identity and also as i said in the earlier

question also the the logo of the party the

symbol it speaks quite clear nobody can really

touch and dismiss the flame and you may say

okay but it's just the symbols i would say

it's not just symbols because you can be

moderating you have been included in you know

like a big system like italy at the european

union level etc etc sure but i mean the

fact that symbolic politics playing a big

role it really means that they don't want you

know like to erase their past they don't

want to dismiss their ideology and don't

misunderstand there are some politicians within

the party they they would like oh but why

we cannot just get rid of the flame it's

the past the the new generation they don't

even know what does the flame means but the

leadership i mean especially giorgio meloni they

say till we will be here the flame will be

there so i mean there is i would say some

consistency there is some coherence from within

the party especially from from the leadership

and this again makes Fratelli Italia

at the European Union level like I

would say quite a model of stability of

consistency with its values even if they come

from a controversial past on the other

hand if you take Salvini his party is

a completely different history And I mean,

it was a meteor for a while back to

2018, 2019, after the government with

Movimento Cinque Stelle, Salvini and his

party, they got very good results at

the election 24, even touching with

polls like 30%. But this was very quick,

you know, like meteoric rise. And on

the other hand, it's completely different.

If you look at Giorgio Meloni, all

the polls since 2022, they are still giving

to Brothers of Italy about 30%, which is

a unicum in Italian history. usually on a

moon phase they don't last long especially

in Italy how come this would be really a good

research question how come that in the case

of this party and Giorgio Meloni they are

still polling at 30% so completely different

I was not surprised that somebody like

Salvini could reach 30% but for me it was

normal that this didn't last long And for

me, it's much a surprise how Meloni

and the Brothers of Italy, they can manage

to keep this party so much appreciated

by the Italians. Right. I mean, it's a

big question. I wonder if Salvini would have

been able to maintain some of his popularity

if he hadn't been embroiled in the oil

scandal and everything. But so far, Maloney

has been able to avoid anything major,

any major scandals like that. And when people

have disrespected her in public, she has

very publicly sort of rebuked them in pretty

strong ways, like in the case of uh the um

friend or associate of the matarella the

uh president of the of italy uh which happened

a few months ago i guess um but so we

have this question which is too big for us

now uh uh why is she still popular when in

in the ever since uh the establishment of

the second or the or the italian republic

uh this has not been normal um even when

it was the christian democracy in the middle

of everything they were cycling through

governments every couple of years um so we have

another question before us as well though uh

which everybody wants to understand which

is how did she get into power in the first

place right because Because the Brothers of Italy was a small party, you know, I mean,

barely above 5%. And then all of a sudden,

they kind of, they became very popular.

I think that your book does a really great job

developing an economic analysis of what

some call the perma crisis that hit Italy

after the financial crisis of 2007, 2008, Which

led to a series of administrations often

caught between being too populist and being

too technocratic. And that led to the infamous

technocratic yellow -green government, which

Salvini was part of from 2018 to 2019,

which sort of had a very marginal technocrat

leading the government who kind of came out of

nowhere. And that was, of course, followed by

the crisis period of the pandemic, which

was another emergency. So how was the Fratelli

d'Italia able to rise in political

stature, particularly by breaking with that

emergency government during the pandemic? yeah

excellent question it took exactly 10 years

for Fratelli d'Italia from its foundation it

was like just a split from Berlusconi's PDL

in late 2012 to rise to the executive power

after the election they won in September

2022 so exactly 10 years and of course it's

not easy to find all you know the reason

but I will say first of all the party and the

leadership they did a very good job to

resist from the the fact that at the beginning

for several years more than several years they

were not performing well at the electoral

level which for a party political party

it's of course you know very bad still they

they resist at the very beginning the flame

of the msc was not in their logo and the

party logo after several years it reappeared

uh at the beginning nobody was really

noticing it then everybody you know like started

like understanding why the flame made a

comeback i would say if i had to find one reason

it really has to do what what you say about

technocracy and to the fact that georgia

meloni identify her government as political

government you may say what does it mean

political government every government is

political true but i mean in italy the peculiarity

is that um citizen they go to vote the

elect uh partisan and representative in the

parliament and then there is you know a

consultation with the approval of the president

of the republic then you have you know your

prime minister but Many, many times in

Italy, let's say the preferences expressed

by the Italians, they were, I would say, a

little bit manipulated. It happened several

times for some issues like, first of all, the

big financial crisis when it arrived in

the European Union with the Eurozone.

In Greece, we had the Troika with the European

Central Bank, the FME, and so all these

austerity measures. So there was some risk

also for Italy and at the time the President

of the Republic, Giorgio Napolitano,

he said it's time for Italy to have once

again a technocratic government, this

time was Mario Monti. And then like after

years we had many, many different

governments changing year after year with not

a lot of respect, I would say, for

indication of the people in the polls till of

course to the covid the 19 the pandemic

once again we had a technocratic

government led by former president european

central bank mario draghi so when georgia

meloni say i can do this also i can take

some radical decision in terms of policies

in italy is because i have a clear political

mandate in the sense that it's not technocratic

government citizen voted for my party we

won the election we have a stable political

right-wing bloc so if people they italian

people gave me and trust me with this mandate

with their votes this really has to be a

political government so in this sense as again

would like seems rather obvious but really

not was not obvious in Italy and this explains

I mean a lot the fact that maybe Italian

citizens they were a little bit frustrated

because like this idea even if we go to vote

there's not a lot of meaning because at the

end you know like the establishment like the

institution they are going to to replace our

candidate our leader with somebody that

they prefer like the financial markets or

like the european central bank they are like to

put you know suggest somebody else to

replace at the time for instance wasilio brusconi

right now it's like they're like okay we

voted for this party we voted for this leader

and she's there and i mean okay this like

uh gives like the the idea that our votes our

opinion that we express in the uh the ballot

box in the during the election they really

matter it's not like that we can vote but

after one year our candidate will be replaced

by the president of the thailand republic

or like you know by a new parliament etc etc

sorry a new vote in the parliament so i

mean this gives the idea the people being a little

bit less frustrated you may say but still

in italy less and less people they go to

vote this is also true we have a big problem

with abstentionism in italy i guess it's

pretty much an issue also in other liberal

democracies i would say but still perhaps the

fact that meloni consider herself a government

to be like a political government somehow

it's a way to address this this issue yeah

i mean i i think it's maybe it speaks also

to the individuation uh phenomenon that i was

kind of referring to initially like people

felt that when they voted uh for the center

left or even for you know yellow green or

whatever they were uh they ended up with something

they weren't voting for right they just

kind of their vote sort of dissipated

into the same kind of economic structures, so

maybe they went to vote for the Maloney-led

bloc, which was the Brothers of Italy and

the Lega and Berlusconi's party and a few others,

because they wanted some kind of direct

representation in that kind of way, a singular

form that they hadn't been able to achieve

prior to that that's very interesting and

i think with the the political government

it is it is such as like a weird thing but

you find that sometimes in in italian political

discourse right with just look at the uh

movimento social right uh the the social

movement that wasn't the social movement it

was a political party so why did they call

it a social movement But they were also, they

were trying to develop a mass party, and

they relied very much on, sorry, they relied

very much on the violence of the youth

groups, actually, to establish that sort

of feel of the social movement, even though

they never really got more than 8% of the vote,

as far as I know, on their best showing.

And then when Ordine Nuovo kind of split up

or was dissolved because of the law against

redeveloping the fascist party, they reformed

themselves as the Ordine Nuovo political

movement, right? Right. So why was that, you

know, a political movement when the earlier

paramilitary formation was not a political

movement? Well, it was like a cultural

metapolitic or whatever. I don't know. So you

have these kind of qualifiers that are

always slightly ambiguous and opaque, but,

you know, in certain contexts, they actually

have a lot of meaning. And I think that's

part of the case here. um but uh she also says

i i don't know there's some discourse that

i want to get into in a little bit about

um the idea of post -ideological government as

well but before getting into that i think

um one of the more interesting things

here about your work on melonia's and and the

party itself is is the structure right because

that's part of the organization right

That's part of the whole subtitle of your book.

So I think I'd be remiss not to sort of probe

this a little bit more. So Maloney appears

to be a strong leader, centralizing the power

of the party while avoiding big party

congresses that often lead to the clarification

of different factions. So the FDI still

kind of has this core of the mass party,

but it's also kind of an authoritarian and

leader-based party where you haven't seen,

where I haven't really observed a whole lot

of factional disputes. So how does this compare

to its predecessors, the MSI and the

Alianza Nazionale? And you were talking

about, for the two years, the Popolo della

Libertà, from which it split in 2012 to form

the Brothers of Italy. So how's their

structure unique? Yeah, also a very good

question, very good observation. Here I

may sound like radical or controversial,

but I really think that Fratelli Italia,

Brothers of Italy, without the leadership

of Giorgia Meloni, would be, you

know, like a completely

different creature, beast. Because

differently from Movimento Sociale Italiano,

MSI, or even Alleanza Nazionale,

that already I didn't know the leadership

of Gianfranco Fini, on this Federal

Italia really took a big lesson from

Berlusconi. I mean, the real, the main change

that Berlusconi added to Italian

politics after following 1994 was that his

party, Forza Italia, was a completely

personalized party. So, I mean,

sometimes I even make this kind of lapsus

when I'm talking of Fratelli d

'Italia, I talk of Giorgia Meloni and

Vice Bersa because, and again, I may

sound a little bit, you know, dismissive

of radical, there is no

Fratelli d'Italia without Giorgia Meloni. It could survive,

but would completely go to other kind

of, you know, like percentage,

electoral percentage. I'm not saying

that right now in the panorama

of, like, of Italy, there

cannot be, like, parties, I mean,

with no personalized leadership. If you take,

for instance, on the opposition, the

center-left Partito Democratico, it's really

an example of party that, you know, they

can change leadership. They have leadership

that are quite weak, also right now with

the Eilish line. um so there is a lot of intra

-party democracy in those you know in political

subjects so i'm not saying that the they

are not alive they are there they can perform

also they can win election but the receipt

of of brothers of italia is really focused

on on giorgio meloni on their skills so i I

mean, there is a circle of people. They are

very close to their leadership. They are also

very skilled. I mean, for instance, Crosetto,

the Minister of Defense, or like the

President of the Senato, La Russa, they are also

very, very skilled. The Minister

for Agriculture, Lolo Brigida, is

also very skilled. I mean, they come

from shared common political culture, from

Alliance Nazionale, from MSI. but still i don't

see i may be wrong uh i can be uh proved

wrong but really i could be no future

for this party without the leadership of i

mean a strong future without the leadership

of of of georgia meloni and i guess

these like the pros and cons of many others

like uh right wing uh populist parties but

this also i would say of populist parties

on the left this is like the big contribution

i would say of populism to to politics

is like the personal personalization of

of politics like you really want to uh uh

to give you know like the power to to to

a leader versus the establishment versus the

the elites i mean this comes with pros it's

obvious many are buying from these,

also Brothers of Italy, but it's also coming

with cons. As I said, for instance, Partito Democratico

will be there also without Erich Line, or

is still there after Renzi and D'Alema, just

to say some leaders. I don't see really Praterina Italia to

have a bright future without somebody

like Giorgio Meloni, or unless, you know,

I could go back to like very, very

low, lower electoral consensus as far as

a new leader capable or more capable

could be than Giorgia Meloni, you know,

has been like found. Yeah, I mean, it's

really interesting. I mean, you're talking

about the Democratic Party of Italy.

And I mean, there are pretty clear

factions there, right? There are people

who contest against Schlein. There are

some people who want to focus more on climate

change, some who want to focus more on

industry, some who have more regional loyalties,

some, you know, so that's like, it's

a, there's a open kind of debate, you

know, in the party. But in the Brothers

of Italy, it's her personal direction,

right? So in Italian media, the one non

-Italian political figure that I think is

mentioned the most besides Trump is

Ursula von der Leyen. But I don't think that

95% of people in the United States would

know who she is even. um however her relationship

with uh meloni is kind of always in the

news they're always it's there's always

this kind of tension and anxiety because it

has to do with the how italy is relating to the

european union and to europe um so can you

talk a little bit about von der leyen and

the importance of her relationship with meloni

and vice versa the importance of Maloney's

relationship with her yeah I think what you

said about von der Leyen the the president of

the European Commission this big very very sui

generis bureaucracy that we have at the

European level it's not just bureaucracy

because it's a mix of power it's really

peculiar the status of the European Commission and

for sure as you said there is a very special

relationship between and I'm saying like

I don't want to say like Italy and the

European Commission I want to be like

between von der Leyen and Giorgia Meloni

and I think this is useful on one hand on

Giorgia Meloni but to be able to speak and

to show also to the Italian you know like

cities that look we have a good relationship

with the european institutions uh look they

they understand us if we are talking about a

model an italian model for migration with the

hot spot in albania just few few days ago

on the on the newspaper like they the from the

european union that is like okay you go

home green light we we like this model we

are studying this model maybe we can try to

implement this model of bringing like migrants,

illegal immigrants to third country outside

the European Union, like a model of the

whole European Union. And on the other hand, I think it's also

very useful to von der Leyen to have like a

partner like Meloni to navigate in,

you know, like the complex water of

Brussels, of the European Union. So very easy.

I would say it's a win-win relationship

and I would say it also has to do to

a special relationship that is developing

right now. It's quite evident between

Italy and Germany, between Mertz and

Meloni. right now i think also mercy understood

that it is important also for him to look

at meloni as a possible model if he doesn't

want you know like to be to surrender for

instance like to have the in the in the close

future so it's like how to go to uh to take

this model of meloni which is a little bit

more radical but also into a frame without

going in other kind of far-right politics

let's say afd or like orban so better meloni

model than orban or like afd so could be

a way to to explain it of course for this

special relationship between uh italy and

germany there is like a big question mark it

concerns the future of france because usually

in europe especially in you know, European

Union without the UK. Paris and Berlin,

they've always been like the big, you know,

couple of the Union. So we will see

what will happen in the next

presidential election. I mean, since I remember, there's always like, oh, next this

time is the good time for the

Front National, it's a good time for the Rassemblement National. But for the specific

way, structure of the system, France that

in two turns it really makes you really to

the side between two candidates at the

second round it's really polarized it's not easy

for a radical party like Rassemblement

National to win so they always say this time

is the good time but yeah in case for sure

the And France, led by a president

belonging to l'Assemblée Nationale, would be like

really uncharted water, I would say. And also,

I don't know what would be the perspective

for Italy. But as I said at the

beginning of this episode, I mean, for sure, we

have in the three big countries of the

European Union right now, italy germany and france

at least according to the to the polls the

political polls three radical right or far

-right parties uh leading in the polls in italy

brothers of italy 30 percent in germany

at the a little bit more than than 30 percent

or really like neck to neck with the cdu

and also in france rassemblement national

polling like as a as a first party you may say

these are only political opinion polls, this

is completely true, still I would say it's

quite telling that in the big three counts,

big three democracy of the European Union

the three parties that are first in the,

according to the polls they are all populist

radical right parties Right, yeah, so sort of on the edge Um, so just a few

more questions. Um, so we're talking

about, uh, Fratelli d 'Italia and the way

that they're kind of distinguishing

themselves from, you know, like you were

saying, kind of the, the politics of, of

Orbán and the, uh, Rassemblement

Nacional and, and even, yeah, Salvini, right? in that

kind of way that they are

pro-European. But, you know, also

they're branding as center-right, you

know. So they kind of differentiated

themselves from the

more ideologically mixed five-star

movement also by rejecting the redistributive

economic reforms. but this conservative

approach to economic redistribution also

included an interesting effort to tax bank

profits which was later pared down um uh so can

you talk a little bit about the economic

position of the brothers of italy in relation

to the center-left and the five-star movement

the other non-right the the non-right wing

you know in in it uh yeah i would say that

the the economy is uh really achilles heel

of of italy uh it makes italy very fragile i

mean we have still a huge uh public debt even

with this government the public debt of

italy is increasing uh there is a big debate

going on right now about increasing the the

budget for the fence and it seems uh is you know

it will be increased because of you know

the demands from from trump uh it's a big

debate but complicated so yes this one still

like uh italian economy is is very uh fragile

we are not so productive i would say that some

measures that were taken as you were

mentioning from other political parties in

the past they were the redistributive nature

like i mean as you say the reddit digital in answer

but they were really costly in terms of the

italian public debt, the receipt that

they've been following, okay, the Italian

trying to cut the extra profit of the Italian

banks revealed to be like meteoric and completely

failure, like in one week completely

faded. I think the most interesting tool that

the government of meloni has been trying to to

do rather low profile rather like without

sponsoring too much and i think also there is

a rationale for this is trying to sell italian

public debt not to institutional actors

because these institutional actors most of the

time they are not italian they are foreign

but to italian citizen they're doing

through this like an instrumental tool

it's called btp

valore which there have been already

several a lot of rounds like uh 10 rounds of

it and they're being like italian uh citizen

they they like very much so only if you are

italian citizen like retail you can buy this

if you are institutional you have no access

to to it so you may say what is the the

new wealthy what is the rationale of it because

i think uh giorgetti the italian minister

for finance but also meloni they are really

aware that in the past since as i said the

achilles of italy is the public debt this was

a leverage for like financial market to blame

like governments say that you do this way

or we are gonna like replace you with another

politician true as what we said in the past

like new election or like new round of

consultation of the parliament or through the

institution like through the president of the

italian republic this already happened in

the past so i mean even if you read books from

from from meloni the autobiography or like

other interviews they and i think they're

right in this they they say how we can solve

how can we try to fix this problem for sure

it's not something that you fix overnight

because we are still, of course, very dependent

on foreigners that have been bought our

debt. But if you see the share that is possessed

by foreigners, by big institutions like

big banks, hedge funds, of the Italian public

debt, it's shrinking vis-a-vis the part of

the debt, the Italian public debt that is

possessed by Italians. So, I mean, it can

be still dangerous because the public debt

is still big and still you know but they

may say at least it's in the hands of italian

families so we have debts but it's possessed

by by our families so we can try even

to convince them to reassure them but

what if it's about big banks what is if it's

about you know hedge funds for energy

and they come to and they say say to you

this or like you know like a rating agency

we will down route you this has been down

really low profile but they've been doing to

to push this sort of economic sovereignism

i would say this they received quite uh quite

well still on other aspects the italian

economy still as i said not very efficient not

very productive there is a lot of of bureaucracy

the salaries are very like stay there

back to you know what they were at the beginning

of the 90s so a lot of bad news but i

think this idea to try to own like more of

the share of the time public debt by the

italian families is can be quite a good idea and

also a second point i guess that stability

political stability per se is perceived by

financial markets something positive so if you

said the rating agency of major like rating

you know of them they've been like upgrading

italian like outlook so at least even if the

public debt is still you know very high

these you know like the agency they are they

are considering italy to be like some somehow

more like you know trustful than in

in the past yeah yeah that's so

that part's really interesting as

well yeah Yeah. So your book talks

about how the appearance on the international

level is quite different from the way

that the brothers of Italy appear on the

domestic level, where they have much more kind

of far right approach. And it seems to me

that this approach is kind of a biopolitical

one. They institute policies designed to

encourage childbirth and limit immigration

and things like surrogacy as a way

of growing the native Italian family that

they view as under attack. So it's really

kind of like, you know, a biological approach

to life in Italy. So is that the

main edge of their right

wing politics? Just sort of this kind

of effort to cultivate the Italian population

from the top? I really see your point. I think this

idea is there. It's something

that is shared by, ideologically speaking,

by many parties of the radical right,

of the far right, and not only them, the

demographic decline. So what can we do? Try

to have our couples and family to do more

children, like less taxes for them. or like

in Italy right now, if you have children and

more than one children, they are providing

you with more support. But still, I see it quite complicated to

achieve that. The only possibility,

the real possibility that we have to

contrast the demographic decline is true like

welcoming uh uh immigrants to to our countries

um for sure this idea is as we said is there

seems a little bit uh this biopolitics something

uh from a comeback from uh from the

past from the fascist era i don't think it's

it's really it's more like in the realm of

the of the narrative so like really very very

ideological but um as a feasibility i don't

think you know like uh any possibility to

to work so still we will have to deal one

way or another we like how we want to to face

this problem and i guess there is no real

alternative to like integrating immigrants

to our country. So this is just, you know, like

trying our families, pushing our family to

have more children. Just cannot really

work. Just like a real, as I said,

of narratives. Seems like these

kinds of things happen from the ground up

and trying to impose some kind of, you

know, eugenics policy from the top is is

not really uh uh particularly viable

in the circumstances um but you know this

is my take um so you see the last

question you see the uh brothers of

italy as an ultimate outcome of a

normalization process initiated from the

post-ideological claims of Berlusconi during

the mid-1990s. There's a big

referendum you mentioned already on the

table in Italy about reprogramming the

parliamentary system to transform the country

into a system where the prime minister

has a lot more power, kind of like the

presidentialist, Gaullist fifth republic in

France or the United States imperial

presidency. um so this has always been a dream of

the italian far right and maybe i'm overselling

and maybe i'm i'm saying you know it's

not quite as powerful as you know macron in

france right but uh um that kind of

model has been like a dream of uh people

connected to elements of the atlantic

environment during the 1970s like randolph

opaciardi edgardo sonio and the notorious

liceo jelly um and i don't know i

was wondering if it's possible by presenting

the individuation of the strong leader

mass party against parliamentary

wrangling maloney's uh ideological post

-ideological political government is something

like a prefiguration of that type of major

transformation um will the individuation of

maloney's government contribute to support

for presidentialism and how do you think it will

be emulated by other political parties in

italy or or in the rest of europe you already

talked a little bit about merits so um so

yeah what do you think about that um yeah

also as i was saying before like This government

and especially the leadership of Meloni,

this really typical of, you know, the populist

roots there, there is like insufferance

to constraint, either at the international

level, external level, I would say like

international financial markets, then internally.

So one of the biggest constraints internally

is the judiciary, and there will be a

referendum next month. The other big constraint

is the mixed role of our parliamentary

system, and especially the figure of the

Presidente della Repubblica, which has some really

important power, makes Italy quite unicum

at the international level to put limits to,

it can dissolve, for instance, the chambers

of the parliament. so this like comes a

little bit from the the monarchy of italy when

italy was a monarchy many many years ago so

this is like constraints to a vision of

politics of of like a leadership like the

one of melone or like this kind of of party

so their idea is like we we go to vote we

elect a parliament and clearly a leader it's

not that you know the parliament with a new

vote can can have a new leader after one

year and then another like in five years of

the legislature we have like five six leader

no we want like stability in the same

political stability we express uh like uh the

victory of a party with a clear leader and

the parliament has to be constrained to this

and also the president of the republic

cannot you know like propose or like remove

and do this kind of so it's like they don't

want to have too much constraint so i would

say this design is quite radical because of

the check and balances that all the liberal

democracies their architecture should have

they are put in danger the separation of

the powers because on the as i said on one

hand you want to focus and want to strike

the judiciary on the other hand you want

to strike you know the the prerogative of

the parliament and the prerogative of the

president of the republic. So, I mean, yeah,

it's like you give and present power to

people going like very ultra majoritarian

system. What about the minorities? How they

are respected? What about the check? What

about the balances? So I would even say

it's like strange form of like a hybrid

presidential republic with really no no constraint

so also imagine you if the future about

i'm just speculating we will have like a

president of the republic like ignazo la russo

and then like a premierato like with a

strong like leadership so i mean in a context

like where you have also at international level

like countries where you know the far right

is gaining ground as i said germany and

uh and like uh france i mean in the past

with the role of the u .s you know granting

like to be like really back on a weekend of

liberal democracy around the world this could

be perceived like we are really constrained

into a part of liberal democracy we cannot

go uh i could get rid of this but now with

the us no more you know like uh putting

pressure to allies to behave like this to

move into this pot so no more big international

uh constraint apart perhaps from the the

financial markets i told you this is still big

you know the public debt is still you know

the italians achilles heel but you know i

told you the solution of this economic

sovereign So it's clear that, and this is

very populist of this government, the idea

that there should be no constraint to the will

of the people, either internal than external.

that's all internal, like president,

like Mattarella, but also in the past,

Giorgio Napolitano, they were playing,

of course, a big role in

constraining, you know, parties and government. The judiciary,

they were playing a big role. The media,

they're playing a big role. NGOs,

you may say, what about the

political opposition? Honestly, if PD and Five Star

movements, they are the opposition right now

they are rather weak but I may be prone

to be mistaken maybe in the next election

they may win the problems not really

that they may win they already did in the past

but how long it will take for them to

fade because I'm sure after a while a

coalition between Partido Democrático and Five

Star Movement they will not last long

on the other hand And this Meloni bloc has

proved to be there and to be strong. So,

I mean, the opposition may even win at the

next general election, but how long it

will last? And also, let's still, you know,

again, it's very, very important always

to put this into the context. There is a

context in Europe and not only in Europe where

the radical right, the far right is gaining

ground. they're like getting more shares

of the electorate, they're getting

more normalized, they're getting

more stable so I still see much

more chances for the radical right to

implement their design what they want, so

their designs are like we want to have

less constraint as possible to the will

of the people Yeah, it's unsettling and

you have to wonder I mean, because Trump

is so unpopular in Italy, how are the

people who have supported him still

managing to be popular? And then you also look

at Lega and there's signs of, you know,

there's a big split that happened recently

because people thought that Lega

was too moderate. Um, and, and so maybe

that would, uh, indicate some kind

of fracture in the electorate going into

future elections, um, uh, for the so-called

center-right block. But who knows? I mean,

a lot does rest in these referendums

coming up. And I mean, Italy, the judiciary in

Italy is a really profound sort

of institution. I mean, it is

everywhere, I guess, but I think Italians take particular pride

in the judiciary. And so it would be

interesting to see the electorate come

out and basically take away some of

its independence. But who knows

what can happen? Thank you so much for, you know, I have lots

of other, you know, thoughts and whatnot.

but i want to be you know uh respectful

of your time and and you know it's

getting late over there thank you so much for

joining the podcast do you have any other

thoughts um yeah just one very extremely

uh quick about what you say the the

split in the lega recently uh this

general that was part of the the salvinist

league roberto van naci decide to have his

own political party Futuro Nazionale, I

would say but it is very speculative of

me, can pose a much bigger threat to

Meloni project than Salvini's Lega because

Ruvannacchi really can play on the same

platform original platform of Giorgia Meloni

and Brothers of Italy not like Salvini's

full improvisation It's much more serious

risk. So here it's like Aether, it's completely

dismissed at the beginning and his party's

project disappeared, but he's able to resist

at the beginning for some years and to

build up. but not she can really be uh the

future of right-wing politics in italy uh

unfortunately i will i will say and to pose as i

said much more as a threat as an alternative

either from within the bloc so from lega

but also like much more competitive

alternative from then the current of position so

if i was meloni right now i'll be wary i

would be quite worried about this project

because if you read van natchy he really knows

how what he wants to do his ideas are really

clear like extreme right ideas it's not

like sometimes uh like supporting like technocracy

and european you know like salvini was

doing other times like no against immigration

so very kamaleonic very changing his mind,

it's really consistent. So in this, it's very

similar to Meloni, but it's much more

extreme than Meloni. So I think this could

pose a real threat as an alternative model

to Meloni and much more closer to, let's say,

similar to Urbano. All right. Well,

I mean, and that gives more weight

to the importance of the upcoming

referendum, you know? So, Dr. Valerio,

Alfonso Bruno, thank you so much for

joining the podcast. The book is The

Rise of the Brothers of Italy, Organization,

Leadership, and Ideology with

your co-author, Mara Morini. It's out through

Springer series in electoral politics edited

by Daniel Stockamer and Daphne Halickepullu.

um and uh yeah thanks so much for

joining this has been right rising the

official podcast of the far right analysis

network i'm your host alexander reed ross

and i hope you join us next time thank you

very much alexander

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