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The AfD's Usage of Emotion, featuring Sophie Schmalenberger

Episode 73 · August 7th, 2026 · 1 hr 25 mins

About this Episode

Right-wing authoritarian and extremist movements are on the march worldwide. This podcast will host some of the globe's leading experts on the radical right to help us understand the development of these extremists. Each episode, hosts and guests bring their specialist insights to break down the critical people, places, organizations, actions, and ideas of the radical right. Produced by the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right

Transcript

doing so much more

yeah this is hard work um hello everybody and

welcome back to right rising the official

podcast of the far right analysis network

i'm your host alexander reed ross and today

i'm joined by the wonderful dr sophie

schmallenberger um dr sophie hello hi so dr

Schmallenberger is a researcher working at the

intersection of extremism studies, memory

politics, and democratic resilience. Her work

examines how far -right actors mobilize

historical narratives, emotions, and collective

memory on social media. She defended

her dissertation at Aarhus University

a couple of years ago and is doing

her postdoc research at the University

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of Duisburg-Essen. Yes, perfect. alongside academic

research she collaborates with policy-oriented

institutions such as the institute for

strategic dialogue and engages with questions

of hybrid threats anti-democratic

ideologies anti-semitism and far-right extremist

mobilization primarily in digital environments

so welcome yes hi thank you so much

for having me here it is a pleasure um

been a long time since you uh were on uh fran

event i think that wasn't the last one

a webinar that we had yeah yeah yeah there

was maybe in 23 20 no 24 probably or even

before i feel like because like my child

was born in 23 so i it was either a year

before or a year after yeah that's always

like the uh inflection point you have a kid

and time just becomes a complete blur yeah

anyway it's fair to say it's been a while it's

been a little while um but you're still kind

of focusing on the alternative for germany

right the afd yes i mean they are hard to

if you if you're looking into far right uh or

anything related to the far right and germany

they are sort of hard to uh evade um so yeah

right so and they're uh right now they're

kind of surging in saxony i think the

latest yeah in um ah in saxony it's saxon anhalt

so it's not saxony oh but it's um not like

the english name just escapes me but it's

basically the federal state next to saxony

also in the former east so it's it you know it's

it's just a just for the german geography

enthusiasts um i can't really do german

geography because they have a bunch of cities

that are the same name but then with like a

thing after it you know like a word after it

to indicate like the river that it's on or

something like that yeah i shouldn't complain

because we have like a thousand cities named

springfield but yeah you also stole some

of our city names and we'll do it again too

so watch out can't trust us um so you've

written a lot about affect emotion and memory

in the social media presence of alternative

for germany and populism in general Your

dissertation is really cool. It's about kind

of feelings, right? Alternative feelings in

Germany or for Germany. Can you talk a

little bit about how emotions and affect

play into the alternative presented

by the AFD in terms of national identity

and German-ness? Yes. So that's a bit

of a trip down memory lane, you know, going

through the process of writing my thesis,

which has been a while ago, but what I

essentially try to argue, what I'm actually

arguing in my thesis and what I also still

stand by, even after reconsidering some of

the stuff I've written, is that far-right

movements and also populist parties and politics

should be understood as political projects

that enable certain ways of feeling or

enable people to feel in certain ways in a

specific national context. And, of course,

I'm not the first to argue that

emotions and affect play a role

in politics in general and in

populist and far -right politics

in particular. A lot, of course, has

been written about the role of passions

and desires in historical studies

of fascism, right? But also with regards

to contemporary right-wing or radical

right populism, others have pointed

out that these parties and movements do politically

mobilize feelings, especially feelings

like fear, as Ruth Wodag did in her

pretty famous book, The Politics of Fear, and

also anger. But I would argue that the majority

of research on the far right has focused

on what we call Ideologikritik in German,

so sort of a discourse critical approach that

sort of dissects and critically deconstructs

the ideological discourses and points

out how, for example, different visual or

rhetorical or discursive or argumentative

strategies are being used to construct racist,

anti-Semitic, ableist, queerphobic, misogynist,

and so on and so on dichotomies between

us and them, and how they justify certain

political positions and programs that these

parties promote, right? Of course, there's

also literature that looks on the

mobilization of emotions, like for example,

Wodak that I've just mentioned, but

that remains also often focused on,

let's say, very distinct and very

particular emotions, often what I would

call, or I guess we sort of commonly

as a society would categorize

as negative or destructive emotions

like anger, fear, hatred, rejection,

disgust, and so on. And what I was basically

doing in my dissertation was trying to develop

a more comprehensive perspective so going

beyond the focus on negative emotions

and looking at what kind of effects and

what kind of emotions are articulated within

far-right politics what these emotions and

effects afford within far-right politics

and what kind of subject positions what

ways of being and feeling do populist far

-right parties enable and in particular

since i was looking at germany um the afd um

so sort of in a broader uh sense i understand

political competition as a competition

between different structures of feeling

that underpin um different ideological um

projects and what i was interested in terms

of the AFD was in what ways these feelings

or these ways of being and feeling into the

world are articulated through their communication

on social media, because the AFD has

been very, very good and has been relatively

early to strategically use social media in

Germany, especially compared to basically

all other German parties, maybe except

for the pirate party that was a thing like

10 or 12 years ago. And yeah, as already the

title of my dissertation sort of hints at,

maybe the main argument is they afford an

alternative way of feeling German. And in

Germany, where sort of dealing with the past

and the commemoration of the Holocaust and

the sort of allegedly at least successfully

working through our past play such a central

role for national identity and the

german reason of state this is inevitably also

connected to a memory political component

or a memory political dimension so to

certain ways of feeling about the past of

course particularly when it comes to

far right party like the afd who from

its very beginning was always implicitly

or explicitly compared or

equated with the NSDAP as sort

of a new, you know, new version

of the NSDAP, which I would argue

is a little bit of a, maybe not a mistake,

but I just, I'm always a bit wary about like

understanding them as a NSDAP 2.0, not

because they are not a total danger for

democracy and a threat to various marginalized

groups in Germany. And they have, of

course, also tolerated neo-Nazis or people

with Nazi backgrounds in their party or

as their supporters. But I would argue

that the AFD is not sort of once, you

know, built around reviving Nazism as

such, but it's operating very strategically

in context of a post -national socialist

Germany. and its memory culture and

sort of the effective and discursive opportunity

structures that exist within post

-war German society. So rather than

offering an effective recurse

to historical racism and

national socialism, I would argue that

the AFD is offering sort of a way to

feel normal again, and that has

different components. Of course, on the one

hand, it's characterized by anger, fear,

mistrust, notions of oppression and

disgust and other sort of abject feelings

towards immigrants on the one side. So what

I think Kazmuda has described, right, is

this, what is that? Well, that's

horizontal, right, against immigrants and

then sort of vertical rejection towards

political elites. elite, so the people up

there, so to say. But I would also, I would

argue, or what my analysis of AFD social media

communication shows is, and it also includes

other feelings like love and affection,

for example, towards the sort of folkish

ethno-nation feelings of our, so sort of the AFDs

and their supporters, moral integrity

and sort of moral superiority, includes

affects of vulnerability, innocence, and longing

for what they frame as just a German or

like a normal German lifestyle in face

of what is often presented or

constructed as sort of

a deteriorating, chaotic presence

in total crisis. Right. And with regard to

national identity, this feeling of

German normality is. It's sort of, I would

argue, of particularly importance because

Germany considers, or like, you

know, the German exceptionalism is, of

course, very strong. So like this idea of

Germany as having this particular past and

building its, unlike all or most other

nations, building its modern identity upon

a rejection of its past, of course, means

that feeling normal again as a German

also sort of has a historical or like a

dimension that refers to how we deal with

the past. So the AFD also enables German

normality in that regard by basically not by

denying the Holocaust or Second World War as

such. I mean, again, there's, let's say,

some people within the AFD who maybe

also could be labeled Holocaust deniers or

do at least something that's very borderline

to Holocaust denial. But what the AFD

does rather is to obscure and omit

Holocaust and World War II and German

war crimes and so on. So basically,

they make them not matter that

much in sort of the bigger picture

of German history and basically

telling contemporary Germans, well,

you basically, you know, it did

happen, But you don't have to feel

anything about it anymore. We felt

guilty for long enough. And instead, they

offer sort of feelings of glory and

pride and achievement and affection

towards seemingly heroic and exemplary

and positive moments and personas

in German history. But, and that's

the last thing before I let

you speak again. At the same time, I

think it's important to understand,

which is something I would do different in

my thesis now compared to what I did

three years ago, is that it shouldn't be

so much understood as an oppositional

counter project to what I in my dissertation

call hegemonic. ways of being and

feeling German, but rather sort of an

extreme continuation of what has always

already been present in discourses on

national identity, but also in sort of

the spectrum of how Germans are able

to feel since the 1990s or since after

the war, basically. So the relation

in that sense is not oppositional,

but rather a continuum. And in

a sense, the AFD, if I would want to put

it very provocatively, has simultaneously

been a main driver, of course, of an

ongoing slight towards the right in German

political discourse. But at the same time,

I would say it's not necessarily or

at least not the only root cause for it, but

rather a symptom of the fact that

Germany has maybe not learned from its past

as well as it claimed. And that this

continuity between what was before and what

came after 1994, no, no, 1945, that's right

here, is maybe not as clear cut as we,

speaking as a German, have told ourselves

for a very long time. yeah uh and and there's

a lot of geographical sort of dynamics to

the to the puzzle right because yes it's uh

largely the former ddr that uh has kind of

gone in for the hour of day rather than west

germany and and the memory culture of the

east is quite different in the sense of um

proposing a much more devout or or you know

acting as though they had a much more devout

commitment to anti -fascism and always

pointing at bonn as sort of uh letting the fascists

in through the side door in sort of the

imperialist nato driven world so the east didn't

necessarily contend as much because they

weren't necessarily forced to contend as

much with the legacy of fascism being as they

were uh presenting themselves as the

greatest victories victors under the soviets or in

relation to the soviets yeah i mean it's um

of course that's um that's right and there's

certainly sort of traces of that on the other

hand i mean and this is not I'm not you know

that's not necessarily research perspective

but just the perspective as you know

I'm like my family is from eastern Germany right

so that's more of a oral history I don't

know like with a very small sample uh kind

of insight um I think one thing is of course

the GDR you know had this like we are the

anti-fascist uh you know alternative to western

Germany kind of thing. But it was not

necessarily what people sort of adapted or

believed. I mean, it was one thing like there was

in many ways, in many contexts, like a very

sort of divide between what they knew was

official state's program and identity and

what people sort of actually believed. And

of course, they said it when they had to, but

that didn't necessarily mean that everybody

felt like they were the heirs of anti

-fascism. And on the other hand, And so that

doesn't mean that there's not, you know, legacies

of that discourse, of course, still also

playing into whatever it is that's going on

in Eastern Germany. But I, you know, I got a

similar question in my, when I defended my

dissertation and I just, just always think,

I mean, with the reunification was, what

is it now, 35 years ago, right? And the GDR

was founded in 1949. So Eastern Germans

have lived longer on the sort of

like a unified German Federal

Republic memory regime than they have

lived in the GDR. Also, if we consider

that, you know, in the 1950s and

60s, also in Western Germany, we didn't

talk a lot about what our parents

had done, right, until sort of 60. So

it just always, I mean, again, I'm not a

historian or I haven't done research on that

topic in particular, but it just always

puzzles me that why these, let's say, 22 or

25 years that Western Germans had a bit more

of a critical reckoning with their past

should have, should be the only thing that

is, you know, like, or should be the main

thing that drives this Eastern West. divides

that we can see um today no i mean there's

got to be a lot more to it and i mean my

explanation is that was extremely simplistic

just coming from conferences where i've

heard other people talking about it right

yeah sure um no i mean i i would you know

also have to totally agree that has something

to do with memory but like i argued one

of my papers that it's i mean partly because

the AFD has just been very successful and

very good in co-opting memory of the peaceful

revolution and sort of this idea of

Eastern Germans being the real Democrats

who brought down the dictatorship into their

ideological projects, taken together

with feelings of marginalization and

devaloration that many Eastern Germans

lived through. in the 1990s and

that also their kids you know i mean my

generation sort of that forms the context

that my generation so people who are i

don't know 35 uh 30 years old now have grown

up with um and that that sort of is um maybe

more of an explanation of of how AFD has

gotten successful than sort of strictly

sort of GDR legacies understood as the time

that happened strictly within the GDR or

under the GDR regime. Yeah, certainly.

I think there's plausibly both

elements at play at the same time, right?

Because, you know, East Germany was

pretty heavily industrialized under

it you know its status as a socialist uh

country and then um you know in the 90s

pretty much all over europe the industrialization

totally transformed the socioeconomic

geography um and uh i think in in some cases

that was really devastating for you know the

the east they didn't kind of get incorporated

into the capitalist structure in the way

that they believed or the way that was sold

to them. And their pre -existing relationship

with Russia offered this kind of doorway to

this other explanation of, you know, kind of liberal

democracy is the enemy. Yeah, I mean, although

I would, you know... so what i think the

afd is is doing is i mean sure you have

you have the gdr nostalgics or austalgics

as we call them in germany because

aust is east right um and sort of the diehard

sed you know like i want the gdr back

kind of people or the hardcore pro russian

people i mean sure um and i guess there's

also been you know now with since the war in

ukraine or like also before that i mean

with digital media and social media and sort

of like disinformation campaigns from russia

of course that like you know people might

have also simply been exposed to so much

um i don't know hybrid warfare disinformation

uh kind of things that that sort of

like, you know, the pro -Russian sentiments

have increased again. But I would say

what the AFD in, at least in the campaign

that I looked at, which was the

2019 campaign, was doing very well is

sort of is offering, so to say, a third way

of saying, well, GDR was shit because it,

I'm sorry, but like, you know, it wasn't

good because it was a dictatorship. We were

not free and we wanted to be free and we

fought for democracy. um so we reject the

gdr but also actually the federal republic

right now is just like the gdr because we're

not free there's like opinion dictatorship um

we are being like our pensions are being cut

we we fought so hard for democracy and sort

of wealth and well you know for our well

-being and liberty and sort of economic security

and look what we got now and all the

politicians they don't know what we want anymore

and they don't listen to us um so actually we

are the true democrats right so there's not

and and in that sense i think by offering

this alternative they managed to do something

that the left in the early 2000s didn't

manage to do because also in the early 2000s

we had a lot of discourses going on about again

hostalgie like sort of eastern germans

whenever like of course that's a bit over the

top i mean eastern germans were had always

been constructed as sort of not so ready

for democracy because they've lived in a

dictatorship for so long and they were also a bit

more stupid and they just didn't know how

to behave in capitalism and in democracy um so

often criticism when it came from eastern

germans it was sort of and especially from

the left who of course had its own problems

with being the legacy party of the SED right

in part so um so it was always dismissed as

yeah well so you want the GDR back or what

so you you were always sort of immediately

pushed in the position of like somebody who

wants to build up the wall again basically

whereas now the AFD offers you a position where

you say no I don't like the GDR no that

no I'm not that but I also hate Merkel or

Schultz or Merz now um so be against the

current state of the art and the

federal republic as it is at the

moment while also sort of credibly

distancing yourself from the gdr because

the afd of course in a sense has

nothing to do with the gr because it doesn't

exist and most of its politicians in

the east are actually from western germany

right so so they also don't have a

sed legacy legacy i think one of the

things where the emotionality comes

into it is this sort of break with

time it's like rupture with the sort of

the strain and guilt of continuity

and an attempt to open a completely

different narrative that you know as you show

in your work i'm i'm actually just

destroying all my i had very nicely done

questions if i do say so myself and now i'm

just sprawling all over the place but as you

show in your work they um they their

version of history is like it goes back i

don't know to like the knights of franconia

or whatever and then yeah it's up to like

bismarck and then like doesn't even

talk about you know the holocaust and

then all of a sudden we're in you know a

dystopia you know and the dystopia was

caused by you know the liberal system yeah

not as a consequence of of the problems

in german history yeah i mean they have

like i mean i think it's just very nice

they have sort of a debate like so the

afd faction in the german parliament they

have like a debate room like every

faction i guess just has a room where

they can have their meetings or events and

they decorated it um with sort of i mean

questionable taste but like with with with

images right of of important moments in

german history and there's literally yeah

there's you know some things things things

things things. Then I think first democracy

in Germany, so 1918. And then there's a

gap. And then the next thing is the peaceful

revolution, right? So telling a sort of

history of liberation, revolution, national

emancipation and democracy by also having the

German flag in every picture, you know, as

a sort of like a the meme that go the

red thread that goes through all the um so

literally this gap that there is in the like

in in sort of like everything that happened

between 1918 and 89 um is very telling

because that's exactly sort of

the the version of of history

that they are trying to um promote

also i mean and you talked about the

the um the regional elections right i I mean,

also in their programs for, in their

educational programs, like for school

curricula, they're trying to push that through,

right? So that different things are

taught in Germany and that, you know, German

history classes in schools would become

more patriotic and focusing on the

achievements of, you know, of Germans and

German figures and the more

proud events. yeah so i mean this

kind of brings us back i mean you're writing

about sort of pre -political emotions and

the way that they kind of build consent for

their positions by creating an emotional

context in which they're they're more possible

um and a lot of this goes back but a lot

of german the history of german democracy

also kind of goes back to this this cultural

level right because and and you're writing

about this as well with that specific scene

of the different paintings um or pictures

and and one of them is uh the festivals that

were taking place in the early 19th century

which kind of like prefigured the 1848

movement and so i think like with this sort of

attempt to rid themselves of guilt and like

embrace this like cathartic public

awakening in many cases uh while also like focusing

really hard on the guilt you know um they

are like trying to formulate a similar

thing that you see in in the history of german

democracy which is this like cultural

festival you know uh or carnival or something

where they can sort of um propose a uh an

inchoate democracy a democracy that isn't

formalized and that gets so tricky right it's

like that populist you know permanent

plebiscite or whatever um because that is like

the situation where and you see it in

rousseau going all the way back to love

him dante unfortunately um this sort of

caesarism right this sort of like dictatorship

that can rise up over the masses through

their like loving consent in the sort of

festival environment yeah and of course i mean there's this sort of like It's hard to put

words on it Because these images

feel very German To me in a weird

way Like, you know, images Of the

French Revolution Don't And it's sort

of hard to put my finger on What

exactly that sort of Vibe Or, I don't know, is But Yeah, still this i

mean like i don't know there's just a weird

way of sort of heroism and uh what is it like

camaraderie instead of english word i don't

know but like this is yeah like the collective

and of course it's highly gendered as

well right um and sort of interwoven also

with like some kind of sense of this i mean

the german folkishness right like this is like

an inherent idea that our culture is just a

bit better than other people's culture and

a connection to sort of the homeland and

nature and like i i don't know like this

this very sort of deep that ontic like like

like this way of being in a sense that that that

that comes through in these pictures yeah

i'm not an art historian or any kind of

historian but uh yeah i think that's a there's

definitely an element in in there and sort

of in general in this whole sort of way of

painting german history and germanness that

that that sort of pulls exactly on this kind

of little string in the german national

conscience i don't know yeah this this question

might be a little bit absurd sort of out

of left field but do you do you think that

they're kind of offering a feeling of

transcendence to uh their followers you know their

supporters or do you think that because you

use the word omtick and this is the question

of transcendence is is sort of a hot issue

in in sort of german historiography or

whatever but i was wondering if if that's

something you think feel free to be like that

that's a dumb question i'm not yeah like i'm

not i'm not i'm not sure i I mean, I think

what they, in a sense, do relatively successfully

is sort of doing a bit of everything.

So I feel like for, you know, especially

if you see their youth organization

and sort of like parts of the party, like

that also have a very strong support for

Björn Höcke, like one AfD leader in

Eastern Germany, and there's all these events

that they are like, I mean, they're sort

of taking to the streets as a little

part of what they are doing. So I think

there's definitely sort of some kind of

level of, you know, bodily experience or

experience of community and revolution or

transcendence or, you know. um but i think that

sort of co-exists with some weird like german

like you can also just want to you know

be left alone in your garden and feel a bit

proud of your nation and have a nice barbecue

and vote for the afd you know so like

there's this weirdly and then they're also your

party So there's like, like it's sort of,

it offers different branches, I feel to

whatever different people feel like, because I

mean, there's like, I've been at a few

AFD demonstrations and you meet like a weird

kind of mix of people. Some just look like

they're going for their Saturday afternoon

walk in, you know, very sporty, functional

clothing and like they don't, they're

not in for the fascist revolution, but they

want to do a little bit for their country

and like go for a walk with their friends,

basically, you know, and it's a, it's a

very weird mix of, of, yeah. That kind of

resonates for me with the MAGA

movement in the US. In 2016, I went to

this rally, this Trump rally in Everett,

Washington, with some journalist

friends. And while we were there, I looked

back and I saw this kid who was probably

about 18 or 19. He's real thin, tall,

wearing all black. And, you know, his veins

were just like popping out and he was just so

into everything Trump was saying. um and

then afterwards we went up to this different

couple a middle-aged couple you know wearing

like you're saying kind of polo shirt and

like you know khaki shorts or something

like that and asked them you know what do you

think of of immigration and they're like they're

coming across the border like mosquitoes

and I was like holy crap like this is like

you know soccer mom and whatever and they're

like speaking in rhetoric that was really

alarming and strange and then we saw that same

kid and I walked up to him and I started

asking him questions and he was kind of like

stone-faced and wouldn't answer any questions

and just played dumb the whole time and I

was like that is so weird like we have this

obvious in my opinion apparently extremist

kid there who's probably into a lot of really

concerning things but won't talk about

anything and then we have these totally normal

people like you're saying like out on a walk

on a sunday and they're like saying the

most the same thing extremists would say you

know so i was like the aesthetics of this are

really weird but um so then this is you

actually do do a little bit of comparison with

the maga movement and afd when you talk

about the way that they kind of set the stage

with um kind of quirkiness they're like there'll

be like some like you know i don't know

how else to describe it some sort of like a

silly thing or you know a disarmingly kind of

um i guess hokey in a way uh which i guess

is described as banana populism which is yeah

like a playful way of spreading very radical

propaganda can you like describe this

like how that works and and you know how you

connect it to maga and stuff yeah i mean it

is sort of the whole idea for that was i think

no it was just before covid but then we

during covid we decided to start this this

block on but then a populism because it was

a um a few colleagues of mine that i met at

the summer school back in 2019 and uh and we

just sort of we did you know studied populist

parties in different parts of uh europe and

one of my colleagues is is from the u.s uh

so obviously also um in the u.s context and

what we just noticed is this like really

random stuff some of them posted like food

or cats or like yeah just just like weird

things that we were like what is why is

marine le pen posting her cats all the time

or like victor orban at the time he had

a lot of like photos with pickles and like

i mean just just and football and like i

don't like i mean just and like boris johnson

had a lot of fish i remember so that was

sort of what we were like this is i mean

but they are all doing that so of course

on the one hand sure it's social media

influencer logic right animals that's always

people find that cute and you know if you

have a cute cat you can't be that bad of

a person right so I like that's certainly

an element sort of it I don't know appeals

to the social media logics and

what we like to see on the internet but then I mean we

sort of started to conceptualize sort

of these weird grotesque humorous

and seemingly random or banal

or bananal as we then called it

mixes of political leadership figures with

sort of these absurd everyday objects and

practices and artifacts. And of course, again,

it's on the one hand making these contents

fun to engage with, but as you also

mentioned, they might be functioning

as a vehicle for conveying radical

messages. So maybe, you know, you're laughing

about the absurdity, but sort of the underlying

implications of what the post is saying

or tries to express might be sort of lost on

you. If you talk about Trump's head, you might

not talk about the radical stuff he's

saying, right? I mean, the memeability,

I mean, it corresponds very

well to social media. Logics is, of

course, also a way to maybe build this

parasocial relation between followers

and politicians, right? Oh, he's

just a regular guy. He also likes to

eat, I don't know, cheese and, I don't

know, like a cheesesteak or something.

Like, I don't know, whatever, like random

national dishes. But actually, what we

also found is it might seem absurd, but it

often actually involves what you could maybe

call, I don't know, culturally meaningful

objects that resonate with some specific

sentiments or have in their particular

national contexts certain connotations in a

given national context. Here again, like Orban

with the pickles, as my Hungarian colleague

argued, you know, like it sort of

resonates with a feeling of nostalgia about

the good old days in Hungary where your

grandmother, you know, would pickle everything. And, you know, Bolsonaro

with a Brazilian football shirt sort of

evokes feeling of this, you know, know

national joy memories sitting together with

your friends um and pride and of course also

sort of a the role that football plays like in

the brazilian context but certainly also

in other national contexts and sort of

national sports and all these sort of emotions

that that um does imply and i think we see

it also you know with the maga hats i mean

like it's such a everyday object um also

so american in a way like i mean a baseball

cap sort of like national one of your national

sports, at least, something so everyday

and ordinary and deeply anchored in

American culture. But these, I

mean, the simple slogan, right,

transforms it into something that

is politically branded. And it's

on the one hand, a completely banal

piece of apparel, but it becomes

certainly suddenly a signifier for your

allegiance to, I mean, radically or

increasingly radical or fascist ideologies.

On the one hand, these objects become

just a cap and at the same time,

they are not just a cap, right? They

politicize and polarize everyday life, no

matter where you go. So making this

ideological divide in society permeates into everyday environments

and situations and turn this into

basically something you cannot or hardly, I

mean, you maybe don't see them in certain

areas that much but you can hardly avoid

it um or escape it and you might see you know

someone with a mega hat somewhere where

you just if you just want to go to the

supermarket and there's a guy with a mega hat

standing in the queue next to you and like

your day is ruined or like at least you

sort of have this like this you know these

guys again so to become this weird effective

hot spots so you either like them or

you hate them right you cannot help but feel

something when you see them and either you'll

put them on your head or you just don't

want to talk to the person who's wearing

one um so there's actually i mean like

some very sort of micro political dynamic of

dividing and dividing and polarizing polarizing

society through these very random

objects so suddenly i mean it was maybe

not the case in the orban example right

but suddenly eating a pickle might mean

you also like orban because he loves

pickles obviously right so so these things

become a very everyday way of expressing

your political allegiance and annoying

your neighbors or your your friends

or your relatives um yeah i thought that

sort of made sense yeah yeah yeah totally i

mean it's it's it's um yeah you don't see as

many maga hats these days but i definitely

remember uh you know like walking

through an airport and there'd be somebody

you know at the at the restaurant or something

like that wearing a MAGA hat and it

would almost be like an act of aggression it

was like yeah like somebody like actively

wants to ruin your day in a way like

that's just the way that it's worn it's not even

like oh that happens to me and I'm sensitive

and it ruins my day it's like that is kind

of like the intention of what's going on

that you just kind of have to like grapple

with but there's this weird like plausible

deniability right because if you say sir could

you take that off it's like oh but i'm

just wearing a cap then ask everyone to take

their cap off right so it's this weird trolling

of doing a relatively aggressive act and

politicizing your environment but not

really like no one can really ask you to take

it off or not do that because you can always

say oh it's just a cap i mean like and in a

sense it becomes this weird like a thing that

you can't really do anything against but

still something that drives some sort of

tension or effective drives some sort

of tension in society. I don't

know how to call it. Anything more precise. Because it's not a

forbidden symbol in the US. But it's not a

swastika that I can't wear in Germany. right

it's like but but but still people you carry

with it all the ideas that it stands for and

you are scaring maybe you know people who

are threatened by by these ideas and political

programs right and i mean it is kind of

like a and i think this is what a lot of

republicans in those in the sort of like the

heat of the maga movement like at the mid to

late 2010s really wanted was to sort of

create this sort of counter punk attitude

right because in the 70s and 80s right like

punk was like this counterculture that would

sort of cause the same types of feelings

because it was so anti -conformist and the

statements it was making in public were politicizing

in a in a space that they felt was

depoliticized and sort of banal right um and

that's kind of precisely what the MAGA movement

was trying to do in the 2010s to polarize

yeah to to create also the adrenaline of it

you know to to sort of engage in these feelings

of uh deep discomfort and violence in a

normal social setting as a kind of uh

transgression that yeah and i mean also as a as

a sort of um what is it like a demonstration

or performance of power because you have

you know you you can manage to turn this

space into something it hasn't been before

yeah right there's you need certain privileges

in order to be able to do that right and you need to be in

a certain like position of uh i mean ideally you're

a white guy um but um yeah and

i guess some some also some weird and

i don't know like like sorry for the

gender it's sort of like a boyish pleasure

in just poking the beehive like a little

bit i mean sort of without actually having

it doesn't cost you anything right i mean

like you just put on a hat i mean it's

uh it's relatively low uh effort for you

but it's uh yeah yeah i mean exactly the the

context is completely distorted but the

the effort the kind of attempt to of

disruption and um destabilization is similar

um and i think like going back to sort of

the feelings and and that kind of stuff

there's this a desire to feed a rage machine

you know to just like get amped up on like

anger and aggression and power um but

that goes back to the afd because one thing

i wanted to ask you about and and one of

the reasons i i wanted to reach out is because

of this investigation that was recently

published by corrective how would you say how

would you pronounce that yeah corrective

yeah i knew it was gonna be that um i

just couldn't i just couldn't um so corrective

showed that the afd has produced an

ai tool that turns out rage bait like what

is this tool and what does it do and why are

people using it yeah i mean i at least

officially um it's not um they will officially

launched it in 2027 but the reporters

who you know who did the digging into that

they were sort of introduced to the tool

by like a guy working for the afd who was

very obviously already using it of some

sort so like they're saying

they're not using it yet really

or only for some like not to the full

fullest of its ability like so it's a little

bit you know unsure are they already using

it or is it you know still in development

um but essentially yeah what they have um

developed or accompanied and sort of was founded

under the uh the afd like uh federal

like yeah the federal afd basically um has

developed uh like a ai tool that generates

um campaign and communication material um

can, according to them, you know, do press

releases, but of course, especially, I mean,

given the day and age, we live in especially

social media posts. And, I mean, in the

thing, they were mainly talking

about, like, posts as in, like, pictures

and texts. I'm not sure if it can generate

videos as well, actually. So the way it works,

according to this report, is that

either you, you being like AFD, politician

or communications person, either

you feed it with a new story that

appears to be a good fit for your

communication strategy. and of course a

prompt like for example saying

generate a social media post that

includes our like central demand

from the AFD for example like create

a post that demands for immediate

remigration quote unquote so you can either

look for a news article or the system

apparently has its own catalog or like

sort of pulls out news stories

from right-wing leaning media

outlets so the afd employees don't

even have to look themselves but

they can basically just say i want

like a story on migrant violence in

dresden or something and it's it will

like find um a story um if there

is one um so they like basically what

this tool is offering is a ready-made system

uh to create far -right outrage and

scandalization that is programmed to maximize

the spread and the engagement of their

messages on social media in particular because

it sort of has an inbuilt algorithm that

rates posts for their outrage and spread

spreadability potential so it's like it's

rating stories basically of what will engage

people based on studies so you know Also, as

researchers, especially social media

researchers, that might also make us wonder

for, you know, what our research is

maybe being used for. And sort of stories

about migrant violence, according to that report,

you know, are what is usually sort of

highly rated by the system and what the

system sort of prefers to produce. so the tool

can on the one and of course streamline afd

communication because it's programmed with

sort of the afd's program in in mind and the

afd's central um um statements and strategies

um and it can maximize content production um

so it you know helps them to uh work further

towards the sort of this proverbial

flooding zone with yeah uh so basically just

pumping out content and content and content

with essentially no cost and effort beyond

developing and updating this tool right but

for the communication people um for example

at local level in some small afd chapter it's

basically no costs and no effort but it

takes probably like 10 minutes or five minutes

to to do the cost um which also enables

because of course on local level you can say give

me a story that is about whatever the

region or the city we are in so it also helps

the afd to immediately adjust their message

to a very local context so it can sort of

feed this image of how um like of the afd

being the party close to the people that

actually cares about the people unlike the elites

uh in berlin um and apparently it can also

be adjusted to different regional profiles and

rhetorical preferences so a little bit more

radical messages in the east where the

rhetoric of the party is generally a bit more

on the sort of right -wing extremist side and

a bit more seemingly harmless ones um in

western german context um and what the tool

has also what the report has also shown is

that it's sort of um it's very good in

softening and normalizing linguistically or

visually very radical um and anti-constitutional

statements so they are harder to identify as

anti-constitutional So in other words,

it also helps the normalization of the AFD's

messages and helps to spread sort of

generally coming back to stories about migrant

violence, right? This idea that we're living

in carnage and, you know, constant violence

that is, you know, coming from across

Europe's borders. And Germany is

basically being violated by the influx

of illegitimate migrants. I mean,

that's sort of the version of reality

that this tool helps. Painting, which

is, of course, you know, the great

conspiracy myth, just, you know,

with pictures now. Right, right, right. I've seen some like in

England when they had the riots there, I

think last year, there were some ai i was

talking to uh dr beatrice buarque uh on this podcast

and we were talking about this and i was

looking at some of these images and they're

like cartoonish so there's like a little

bit of like this like weird i don't know some

in some of these cases it's like a political

cartoon and the ai cartoon is like you know

the figures are almost like in this like

wacky sort of like presentation but

again like there's

extreme violence and like disgust and

like you know horror and ruinousness and

scandalization all of it in there as well

so there's this weird combination um but uh

she was saying she says that uh they you know

contributed to the exacerbated the the riots

in england um and i was wondering if you

think that this uh afd tool will have a kind

of similar effect at increasing violence for

people yeah i mean right as researcher it's

always uh some hesitation about predicting the

future but like i mean yeah i would say yes

because it's like it's fueling tendencies

that we have already seen in in the past

right it just makes them more coast efficient

um it's it's fueling narratives that have

already been propagated by the far right um and

as Beatrice has also pointed out uh in in

the podcast I think like these studies that have

shown that there is like connections between

extremist propaganda and actually and

sort of inflammatory messages and actual physical

violence um breaking out um also um what

i forgot to mention this tool um it seems

to be able to circumvent some so it's it's it's

running based on like big ai systems and

models right so the afd has not built its own

ai it's basically using claude and chat gpt

and gemini uh for different purposes um

in in that machine so to say um but it seems

to be actually able to circumvent um um like

guidelines and rules that these models have

for example they were able to generate like

a picture of a burning rainbow flag which

somehow you know shouldn't be able when you put that

into i don't remember i think it was chat

gpt they used but then sort of their ai

reformulated the prompt so that it would actually

you know be formulated in the way that would

end up doing it. At least that's

how they explain it. I'm not an

expert on AI. So that combined

with the sheer amount of sort of inciting

content and sort of this portrayal

of Germans or English people in

Beatrice's context, as sort of being

constantly victimized and immigrants as sort of

violent and criminal and I mean, almost

barbaric committing acts of violence all

the time um i think does fuel this version or

like makes violence seem i mean legitimate

maybe even unavoidable in as an act of

self-defense right i mean because because

i think what the afd is also managing to

do is is that violence that you direct either

against the state or against or like

political elites or immigrants doesn't feel

like you're the aggressor necessarily from sort

of the perspective point of view of

the person who's perpetrating it of

course they you know they might all you know some

people also just like violence maybe or have

other issues going on while they want

to engage in violent activities but i think

there's at least a sort of like effective

legitimization strategy of telling yourself

no this is not i'm not i'm just defending

my family or my country or or whatever

so that's of course, a narrative and a

story that people can tell themselves when

they take the streets. And I think another

thing that I was just, I mean, you know,

considering last week's events on the

European borders, what of course

these images also obscure is the

actual violence. that sure i mean a lot

of incidents of these i don't know some

like a asylum seeker committing a violent

crime of course i like a lot of them have happened

and of course there has been victims and

they deserve you know justice and like you

know they deserve to be mourned and they

deserve to you know be remembered and so on

right but what these images obscure is the

massive amount of violence and suffering that's

going on elsewhere, also the major dimension

of violence and suffering when we talk

about contemporary migration developments

and regimes that remain invisible, that these

pictures obscure if they become the

picture that symbolize contemporary immigration

into Germany. while of course at the

same time dehumanizing immigrants right as

as as notoriously violent and not human

in a sense but only surfacing as aggressive

invaders quote-unquote yeah i mean so one

thing that you mentioned in in your chapter in

the recent book germany's history wars is this

concept of limits of speakability um and

i wonder if this and this is kind of this

goes into the ways that the european new rights

and the german new right uh use kind of

emotions uh culturally embedded in order to

circumvent uh having to necessarily outline

and articulate and explain everything that

they're insinuating yeah um does it so

does it go does it does that operation kind of

also enable this kind of anti-rationalism

like are we talking when we're talking about

like the emotionality and the the sort of

focus of populism on emotions are we also

talking in a way about in because you know

some people have defined populism as anti

-rationalist you know going back to like the 80s

uh like taggart or whatever um so i was

wondering like if you where you where you kind

of land in in considering the off day anti

-rationalist because you're also kind of

saying like they're not like necessarily nazis

they are filling gaps they're they're filling

opportunity you know um i forget the word

that you used but uh they're they're taking

advantage of political opportunities in

order to like create this yeah i mean of

sort of yeah political cultural effective like

all kinds of opportunity structures that have

been which has not been politicized right

yeah which is highly rational yeah i mean

in that sense i think they've been

highly rational in the sense of

of identifying these and on and

in politicizing aspect so sort of

the sentiment of oh i don't want to think about

the holocaust anymore like i mean sorry like

but very colloquially spoken yeah it's

always been there like as long as i can think

we thought that you know like people

have been saying that when i had history

classes like oh not again hitler you know like

there's been studies about like denying any

involvement of your family to that and

like sort of this this idea for final final

line as we call it right under like yeah let's

just stop talking about it it's always

been like the afd hasn't brought that into

german society it's always been there um

it has somehow been i don't know moderated

or simply not been politicized um and

brought to the surface but the afd has sort of

taken that up and or it was again it was by the

nazi party right the ns um the npd back then

sort of the radical the ones that were

like basically saying yeah we are the new

nazis which was a bit yeah which was just

too much um because you know like and i think

this trick that the afd is doing is is

exactly not claiming to be the new nazis but

saying no no we also because they would

rhetorically always say no like that was bad like

and actually i mean similar to what trump

is doing right like national socialism you

notice something there's socialism in that so

actually Hitler was a socialist right so

sort of yeah you know it's an interesting

sort of so maybe the rational reality stops

when it comes to you know bending historical

terms but in that sense they have been

really strategic in and sort of extremely good

readers of of sort of some you know political

potential that has been there that sort

of started with the euro crisis where i

would also say i mean they were founded as an

anti-euro party right which i feel i mean

what you know was maybe a first step in breaking

sort of the german commitment to the

european union which has of course always

been constructed as like a legacy or lesson

learned from world war ii we are now responsible

that the european continent is gonna

you know live happily ever after because of

what did in the past um so there's always

been relatively broad consensus like a pro

-european one among german parties because that

had been part of our national identity right

in the afd by sort of starting to break

this and say no we should actually not pay for

the rest of europe like that was

sort of the first like it's not that

that wasn't speakable before but like

breaking the first maybe not a big taboo but like

a breaking a certain consensus of what

what we are supposed to do um and that's

that like and in that sense i don't think

it's it's it's been surprising that it's

sort of this turn towards the right

because that's that was the first baby step and

then you know we had the we had 2015-16

um and sort of the summer of welcoming

migrants sort of was over relatively soon

And, yeah, people started to remember that we

actually, Germans are actually a bit

racist after all. We haven't become super

nice people after 45. But, yeah, in that sense, they are rational. of course like the main stuff that they are

telling is either you know wrong I

mean factually wrong or I mean you

know this sort of conspiracy like

yeah they of course not rational

necessarily in that they

are fact based but I would

say that I mean in themselves they

have some sort of I would say an

emotional logic they feel right so

it doesn't matter and I mean I

would say that sometimes about

my own political beliefs if there's

just something I don't want to

hear even though it's sort of

factually right like I just don't

want to deal with it you know like I

mean I don't think irrationality is

something that we should attribute

only to populist and radical right

-wing actors, but that's to be

found every, I mean, you know,

like the Christian Democratic Party,

like with climate, we all, like it's

completely irrational what most parties in

this world are doing, right, if you would

only think about what's best for the survival

of humanity. So this claim, you know, that

they are the weirdos who only do the feelings

and we're actually the ones that handle

everything based on science and everything.

I mean, this is also not completely true.

Although, of course, they maybe use more

simplistic or sort of, I don't know how to say,

more pleasurable feelings than other parties i

don't know if that's a yeah i mean that's

a that's just me rambling i guess no i

mean that's that's very interesting so you know

they and that's kind of been what's enabled

uh more of an effect right is the is the

way that they've been able to galvanize

people's feelings uh which have previously sort

of felt more repressed i guess so so there's

that as well but they're also just such like

a important part of the repression that

they're trying to alleviate or whatever so it's

always a little bit yeah but there's also

i feel this little double bind of you

know again in a german context right because they

would construct that's what they say as a

liberation and i have to say like i mean in

a way of course it is because it breaks with

you know the state -sponsored official

ritualized kind of memory culture if we like

with context to german history or you know

saying racist stuff basically um like

you know this

official construction of germany as civic

nation but then again like i mean as a

german who's lived in Germany it's also like

you've always been able to say racist stuff

you know so it's also this weird construction

of like a of of repression and restriction

because you know like we like there's

never been a time in Germany where you you

know could not like I've heard a million times

people denying or trivializing the holocaust

and stuff like you know so and without

having any facing any repercussions or saying

racist stuff and so it's also this weird imaginary

of being oppressed by something that

they at the same time they create the

oppression that they then offer relief from in

a sense right um yeah it's their it's their

world um so which again is is part of that whole

like white privilege you know usurpation

of other people's suffering and struggle

um but you list uh female innocence motherhood

male heroism and masculine protection

and heteronormative continuity in propaganda

that quote mobilizes affects of fear threat

pride and belonging right so is are these

like are these types of gendered values present

in those ai rage bait creations in germany

because i know um buark is talking about

how they're very much there right that like

the male is defending the poor english woman

from these migrant hordes or whatever

right so and there's all this kind of history

that's sort of like really like myth that's

kind of inserted into that is it the same

in germany because the gender thing seems

similar yeah yeah yeah i mean i think it's it's

um you know the playbook of like gender roles

generally cultivated by far-right movements

right i mean there's of course you don't

have this little saint george and the dragon

you know this whole english mythology yeah

i'm not super familiar but of course sort of

you don't have have that um going on but

of course then you have the good uh you

know the well-trained uh athletic german you

know like you of course still have like an

ideal of a german man right um that's maybe

not a knight um but sort of more of a kind

of i mean yeah like kind of not like viking

aryan like i mean not not explicit

but but still i mean like they would probably

be blonde right so they are still of

course a resonance of like an ideal typology

of what it what a real german man looks like

that is um that is inherent um i mean i

haven't seen material or i i don't know if

i've seen material that this tool has

produced but But since it's being fed with

what the AFD has communicated before and

what their programs say and so on, I mean, I

assume it will only sort of exacerbate

these gendered images. And of course, I

mean, also when these victims of migrant

violence, quote unquote, is usually young

women right like our sisters and daughters

so like a innocence and i mean in a sense

like youth but also innocence uh as as

as a femininity and of course this you

know underlying the woman as you know

recreating the nation and nurturing the nation

and if they take a woman then the nation

will die basically so of course this

this sort of trope is is also also present and of

course this idea like idealization of the

nuclear family sort of basis for the like a

progressive patriarchic ideal of society which again is of

course not too far away from a German sort of

conservative mainstream that also sees mother,

father and child or ideally three or four

children as the ideal right so when the

main like conservative party is saying society

must be defended you know that kind of thing

um all the afd has to do is say well what

are they actually doing about it you know

yeah you have to get involved you know that

kind of thing yeah they usually they would say

oh look now uh friedrich merz is uh is saying

something about protecting german families

but yeah what what has merkel done and we

have been saying this for 10 years so like

who is the you know like he's just he's

just he doesn't mean it right we actually right

so it's uh yeah right so my last question and you kind of maybe i think made increase the stakes

of this question uh when you said that

they're kind of like emotionality is is stronger

in some ways i don't remember the exact

wording you used i'm probably butchering it

um but what do you think that people can

do to diminish the effectiveness of these

types of technologies and these images and this

emotional politics um that the the right is

using yeah i mean maybe not necessarily stronger

but i feel that's always i always try to

find a language that's not sort of morally

evaluating um i mean maybe maybe easier or

less complicated or more enjoyable i think

that was what i said sort of like uh not as

you don't have to be as reflective right if

you just if you just want to be proud of your

nation instead of like thinking about the

Holocaust you know I mean that's because

also through this whole like dealing with our

past we sort of in the end arrive at a notion

of national pride in being and having overcome

our darkest you know moment in history

but that's a bit more effective you know that's

that's more effective labor in a sense to

go through the shame and the guilt to then

arrive on a moral higher ground instead of

just saying nah I just I just like Bismarck

and I'm fine with that so what can we do

I mean that's I guess I don't know

probably at this point the 1 billion

dollar question but maybe and I'm saying

this carefully not react to them or

not give them more attention and

effective engagement than we absolutely need

to I mean and I don't mean you know i mean

we live in a attention is is currency and

the more time and attention we spend on

far-right actors the less time we have to do other

stuff um and i don't mean i don't mean

you know we yeah just abolish the far-right

analysis network just don't like to pay any

attention now i mean of course we we should

deal with this as as researchers and and so

on right and analyze it and and and and so on

um i think what i mean maybe more is refuse

to become attuned to these effective dynamics

and rhythms that the far right is trying to

enforce upon us like this sort of the constant

i mean this flooding the zone with shit

kind of like a constant outrage and like a

new scandal and a new thing and like a new

angry like something that happens that we sort

of react to i mean in in comments or that

we because it often becomes almost like all

we talk about is what they have said and then

we sort of agree that it's fucking horrible

sorry that it's very horrible and and

that's that's of course right um so and and of

course you know we we need to think about what

we do um and of course we should not you know

ignore the devastating consequences that

you know political actions have for those

who are targeted by it. But I don't know,

like the best we can do as I think to

spend sort of our time and energy and attention

and engagement in activities that counter

these destructive politics. I mean, I

think we should still be angry and we

should be outraged and we should be scared

because it's scary what's happening and

because, you know, their inhumanity

and and everything makes me scared

for my child and for a lot of my

friends and for their well-being. And

it's outrageous. But I think, I mean,

we have to somehow turn this into

practicing care for each other and compassion

and show solidarity by those who are

primarily targeted and effective by,

I mean, concrete violence or threats

of violence or the sort of implications

of certain policies and start having

discussions about a world that we imagine

that is not just responding to sort

of the cue that far -right actors are

giving. I mean, I mean, that all sounds

like very, very sort of hippie kind of

idealistic. And I know it's hard if you're

currently being, like stuff comes to

your new new stuff comes to to your phone uh

right and and it's um but i feel we have to

develop more than just a response to because

we're currently gonna have to come up with

new responses and i'm actually i'm really

like my poor boyfriend but like i'm getting so

annoyed my boyfriend's like oh like you see

like trump said this and this weird thing

and i'm just like i don't want i don't care

like i don't want to hear what this man is

saying and i feel if everybody had just

listened a little bit less to what this man

has been saying he maybe wouldn't be president

now you know if we just had been like

yeah i guess that's an old weirdo um yeah okay

now he's running for president yeah let him

do that i guess and of course there's a

lot of money behind him and i don't want to

diminish that but you know still um not talking

about what they've been saying but what

we um do instead i think a lot of education

conversations and discussions uh of

course also necessary a lot of young people who

who grow up on social media or who spend

a lot of time online especially also during

covet of of course um in the current

postdoctoral project i'm working on where we did

interviews with young people there's actually

immense need they really want to talk once

you get them talking about antisemitism in

that case um because they're alone with

it they just see a lot of weird stuff on

social media and they they don't know what

to do with it they don't know how to

contextualize it they know it's fake

but then again like what is not and like

they they really want to talk and

discuss um and I think that's not only for

young people because we spend a lot of time

online as well right I mean like to to sort of

um talk about what we think and what we what

we feel um about it and I think another

thing um you know which is of course super easy

to do is uh fight the structures and the

the conditions that enable the far right um

and facilitate their rise um starting with

social media companies whose algorithms i mean

work in favor of far right contents right

they are more likely to spread in the ways that

social media platforms work at the moment

the afd's ai tool is built on the basic of

the biggest AI models. Yeah, so, I mean,

like, advocate for laws and regulations for

the companies that are basically

profiting, I mean, very literally, from the

rise of the far right. And also contribute

to the fact that far right and hate propaganda

in general has become a business model. I

mean, a lot of people make their money, Not

necessarily, I think, because they are committed

to the cause, but simply because it

generates clicks and they get some, you know,

good money out of it. And sort of, yeah,

I know it's all very idealistic

and I, you know, I just, I just

like to think that we, there's

stuff we can do. Otherwise, I also get

depressed, I guess. um no i think that

that's really interesting it's kind of a

emotional independence from patriarchy in a

sense that you know we need a little bit

more because when our emotions are always

being kind of um reactive towards it uh yeah

we're still bound to it but if we can

actually create our own democratic society you

know we can have our we we can have

independence from the what what has been for a

long time a central cause yeah i mean

it's it's sort of also this like constantly

reacting i mean i'm not a psychologist but

it's me myself uh you know i'm also getting

sort of this it's exhausting i mean because

you feel constantly feeling like or

you're being chased to the next thing and it's

not really rewarding because there will be

another pile of crap on the next goalpost,

right? Because, you know, there's

another truth social post or whatever. So it's

just this, you know, deciding not to run that race that is

suggested to you is maybe one way out.

I mean, I don't think, probably not work

from one day to the other, But just refusing

what they are proposing in sort of a, not

only on the level of concrete political

demands and programs, but sort of on the whole

way of how the show is running, in a

sense, is maybe a way. while also and i think

there's also it's important to be outraged

and to be you know to express that that you

are that's something you know it's unacceptable

and uh because we also have to remind

ourselves of that because you know then

otherwise you become the couple in the

in the functional uh clothing who's uh

talking about immigrants as as mosquitoes

right um if you don't remind yourself

what humanity is and that we all deserve

it and that it's outrageous to to uh

to deny it to someone amen um um well

thank you so much dr schmallenberger really

appreciate uh all your work and uh you joining us

for this episode um do you have any i mean

you you publish quite frequently articles

and chapters and things like that do you have

anything up with the postdoc stuff that you're

doing yeah i mean i have uh again because

i had a kid right so there's this weird like

year and a half where i just didn't do

anything so that sort of reflects in the publication

hiatus that's uh currently uh going

on but i have a piece coming out with some

colleagues in Sweden, which is on how a different

party commemorated the liberation of

Auschwitz on social media. I mean, not a fun topic, but sort of diving into some discussions of

what Holocaust memory means for the present

in Germany, also in relation to all the

discussions about antisemitism in Germany,

and sort of policing of what some argue is antisemitic. And so on. And we're currently finishing up a paper

on the interviews that we did on experiences

with antisemitism on social media in

Denmark and Germany. Sort of the next things that hopefully come out. Wow, very

interesting stuff. Well, thanks so much

for joining us again. I am Alexander Reed

Ross and this has been the the Far

Right Analysis Network's official

podcast, Right Rising. And we've been

talking with Sophie Schmallenberger. Thanks again, Sophie. Thank you so much. How do I stop this? I can never stop that. There we go.

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